Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 7

7-1-1989

Voluntary Dismissals in Illinois
Robert G. Johnston
lain D. Johnston

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Robert G. Johnston and lain D. Johnston, Voluntary Dismissals in Illinois, 9 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 515 (1989).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Voluntary Dismissals in Illinois
ROBERT
IAIN

D.

G.

JOHNSTON*

JOHNSTON**

Plaintiffs may take voluntary dismissals or nonsuits in Illinois
courts' and Federal courts.' Section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure3 gives plaintiffs the right to voluntarily dismiss their
claim to correct "a procedural or technical defect." '4 Rule 41(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives plaintiffs in Federal courts
a similar right. "[T]he language and history of Rule 41(a) imply [that]
the general purpose of the rule is to preserve the plaintiff's right to a
voluntary nonsuit and start over so long as the defendant is not
hurt." 5
The Illinois statute allows plaintiffs, to dismiss their claims, upon
notice 6 and payment of costs7 as a matter of right'-without preju*

Professor, The John Marshall Law School, J.D., University of Chicago

(1960).
** J90(D) The John Marshall law School, B.S.G.S., Rockford College (1987).
I. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 para. 2-1009 (1986). See text accompanying note
20 for statute. "Dismissal" and "nonsuit" are synonymous. Connor v. Copley Press,
99 Ill.2d 382, 459 N.E.2d 955 (1984). See also Juen v. Juen, 12 111. App. 3d 284,
286, 297 N.E.2d 633, 635, (5th Dist. 1973) ("The terms nonsuit and voluntary
dismissal without prejudice are used interchangeably because there is no difference
in effect between them.") City of Palos Heights v. Village of Worth, 29 Ill. App. 3d
746, 749, 331 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1st Dist. 1975) ("[T]he terms 'nonsuit' and 'voluntary
dismissal without prejudice' are used interchangeably because there is no difference
in effect between them.") See also Gilbert v. Langbein, 343 III. App. 132, 134, 98
N.E.2d 140, 141 (1st Dist. 1951) ("There is no difference in effect between allowing
a nonsuit and dismissing the case without prejudice, because in either instance another
proceeding may be instituted."); Bailey v. State Farm & Cas. Co., 137 Ill. App. 3d
155, 158, 484 N.E.2d 522, 525 (lst Dist. 1985) ("A hearing or trial, then, 'does not
begin until the parties begin to present their arguments and evidence to the court
sitting without a jury in order to achieve an ultimate determination of their rights."').
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 41. See text accompanying note 88.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para 2-1009 (1987).
4. Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 137, 535 N.E.2d 858, 865 (1989).
5. McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985).
6. Bailey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 137 II. App. 3d 155, 484 N.E.2d
522 (1985).
7. Id.
8. Davis v. Int'l Harvester, Co. 139 I11. App. 3d 264, 268, 487 N.E.2d 385,
388 (1988) ("When notice is given and proper costs paid, the plaintiff's right to a
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dice-provided that the defendant has not filed a counterclaim, 9 or
that a trial or hearing has not yet begun.' 0 However, once a counterclaim is filed or a trial or hearing begun, a voluntary dismissal is
allowed only by stipulation of the parties or by leave of court."
Federal Rule 41 (a) allows plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss a case before
a defendant serves an answer or moves for summary judgment. After
service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, a voluntary
dismissal must be stipulated to by all the parties who have appeared
in the action, 2 or must be ordered by the court. 3 Thus, unlike the
Illinois statute, the federal rule gives the trial court more control over
plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal.
Many feel that plaintiffs in Illinois abuse the right to voluntarily
dismiss in order to harass defendants or to avoid or delay adverse
judgments. 14 Because federal judges have more discretion in ruling on
voluntary dismissals, defendants urge a statute similar to the federal
rule be adopted in Illinois.' 5 However, despite the more restrictive
voluntary dismissal without prejudice prior to trial or a hearing is absolute, and the
court has no discretion to deny the plaintiff's motion for dismissal.") Davis so held,
despite the fact that plaintiff failed to comply with defendant's discovery requests
within 30 days as ordered. Heinz v. County of McHenry, 122 Ill. App. 3d 895, 897,
461 N.E.2d 672, 674 (1984) ("nor does the granting of such a motion [dismissing the
complaint] with leave to amend ... affect plaintiff's absolute right to voluntarily
dismiss her [case]."). Id.
9. Kendle v. Village of Downers Grove, 156 II1. App.°3d 545, 553, 509 N.E.2d
723, 728 (1987).
10. Kahle v. John Deere Co., 104 I11.
2d 302, 309, 472 N.E.2d 787, 790 (1984).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987). For further restrictions
imposed by the Illinois Supreme Court by case law see text at notes 58, 41 and 50
under Gibellina v. Handley, 127 I11.
2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989); O'Connell v. St.
Francis Hospital, 112 I11.
2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986); and Muskat v. Sternberg,
122 I11.
2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988). Gibellina permits the trial court to hear
pending dispositive pretrial motions despite a request for a voluntary dismissal.
O'Connell requires a trial court to hear a pending motion to dismiss for lack of
diligence in serving summons despite a request for a voluntary dismissal. Muskat
requires a trial court to measure diligence on a motion to dismiss for lack of diligence
in serving summons from the time the limitations period expired when a timely case
was filed, then voluntarily dismissed after the statute ran but before service of
summons was made, and finally refiled, rather than measure it from the time the
case was refiled to when service of summons was made.
12. FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a)(1)(ii).
13. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(l)(ii).
14. Voluntary Dismissal Limit Urged by Judge, Chicago Daily L. Bull., Apr.
18, 1988, at 1,col. 2; see also Ferrini & Winter, Voluntary Dismissals-From Shield
to Sword By the Convergence of Improvident Actions, 21 J.MARSHAL L. REV. 549
(1988).
15. Id.
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right to take dismissals, it is unclear whether adoption of a statute
similar to the federal rule will diminish possible abuse of the judicial
system. Because of the "two dismissal rule," ' 16 the liberal granting of
voluntary dismissals, 7 and the narrow standard of review, 8 any abuse
now existing in Illinois might still continue under a statute similar to
the federal rule. Furthermore, the defendants are not without procedural protections against abuses. Defendants may ask for sanctions
that range from dismissals with prejudice to fees and costs.' 9 Finally,
the abuse most complained of-that of delay-takes place at the
federal level in spite of federal Rule 41(a), and is committed by
defendants as well as plaintiffs. 20 This paper suggests that since the
Federal rule generates complaints similar to those generated by the
Illinois statute, adoption of an Illinois statute similar to Federal Rule

41(a) will not significantly diminish perceived abuses stemming from
voluntary dismissals.
I.

ILLINOIS VOLUNTARY DIsMISSAL STATUTE

The statute governing voluntary dismissal in Illinois is Chapter
110 § 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. It provides:
(a) The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing
begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or each
such party's attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his
or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without
prejudice, by order filed in the cause. Thereafter the plaintiff
may dismiss, only on terms fixed by the court (1) upon filing
a stipulation to that effect signed by the defendant, or (2) on
motion specifying the ground for dismissal, which shall be
supported by affidavit or other proof. After a counterclaim
has been pleaded by a defendant no dismissal may be had as
to the defendant except by the defendant's consent.
(b) Counterclaimants and third-party plaintiffs may dismiss
upon the same terms and conditions as plaintiffs.2'
16. See infra text accompanying notes 116-117 for discussion of the effect of

"two dismissal rule."
17. See infra text accompanying note 119 for discussion of the effect of trial

courts' liberal standard for granting voluntary dismissals.
18. See infra text accompanying note 127 for the effect of narrow standard of

appellate review.
19. See infra text accompanying note 136 for discussion of the effect of other

procedural rules.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 131-135 for discussion of delays in
litigation.

21. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

The plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal has been described as
absolute. 22 However, this absolute right has both statutory23 and case
law 24 restrictions.
A.

STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS

1.

When does a trial or hearing begin?

The plaintiff has an absolute right to a voluntary dismissal before
a trial or hearing. However, since section 2-1009 does not define the
term "trial, ' 25 questions arise as to exactly when a trial begins.
Questions also arise as to when a hearing begins because "hearing"
has been given confusing treatment by the appellate courts. 26 For
bench trials, trial begins when opening statements are made or evidence is presented. 27 For jury trials, trial begins at voir dire.2s Thus,

examination of prospective jurors indicates a trial has begun; 29 section

2-1009 does not require that a full jury be selected. Even if only a
22. Jacobson v. Ragsdale, 160 I11.
App. 3d 656, 662 513 N.E.2d 1112, 1116
(1987) ("As has been stated often in recent decisions of this court, the voluntary
dismissal statute grants plaintiffs the absolute privilege to dismiss regardless of the
circumstances or motive.").
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
24. See Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989); Muskat
v. Sternberg, 122 I11.
2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988); O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital,
112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986). See also infra notes 41-64 and accompanying
text for further discussion of these cases.
25. Cummings v. Simmons, 167 Ill.
App. 3d 544, 547, 521 N.E.2d 634, 636
(1988) ("The Code does not define the term 'trial."').
26. In re Marriage of Fine, 116 111.App. 3d 877, 879, 452 N.E.2d 691, 692
(1983) ("The question of whether a 'hearing' has commenced . . .so as to bar the
plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss the action has been given confusing treatment by
various panels of the appellate court .... ")

27. Kahle v. John Deere Co., 104 I11.
2d at 308-310, 472 N.E.2d at 790 ("[A]
hearing is a nonjury proceeding in which evidence is taken on the merits." It is the
equitable equivalent to trial.)
28. Lighthart v. Pesner, 157 I11.
App. 3d 66, 68, 510 N.E.2d 84, 86 (1st Dist.
1987) ("[W]hen no jury has been selected, no prospective jurors have been examined
or sworn, and counsel has made no opening statement, a trial for purposes of section
2-1009[a has not begun.").
29. Kahle, 104 111.
2d at 310, 472 N.E.2d at 790. The court ruled that motions
in limine heard on the day the case was scheduled for trial did not constitute the
beginning of trial. It further ruled that since no juror was examined before plaintiff
took a voluntary dismissal, trial had not begun.
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few jurors are selected, trial has begun, and the plaintiff cannot
voluntarily dismiss as a matter of right.30
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of section
2-1009,"a 'hearing' is the equitable equivalent of a trial."'" Thus,
hearings pursuant to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action do not commence a hearing under section 2-1009.32 A hearing
does not begin until the parties start to present evidence and arguments
to achieve the ultimate determination of their rights.33
2.

Counterclaims

Once a defendant has filed a counterclaim, a plaintiff may not
voluntarily dismiss the action.3 4 A counterclaim is "(a)ny claim by
one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one
or more co-defendants, whether in the nature of set off, recoupment,
cross claim, or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for
30. Cummings, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 544, 521 N.E.2d 634 (the examination of
prospective jurors and the swearing in of a panel of four jurors was deemed to be
the commencement of trial so as to bar the plaintiffs absolute right to a voluntary
dismissal.).
31. Kahle, 104 Ill. 2d at 309, 472 N.E.2d at 790 ("a hearing is a nonjury
proceeding in which evidence is taken on the merits."; Espedido v. St. Joseph
Hospital, 172 Il1. App. 3d 460 469, 470, 526 N.E.2d 664, 670 (1988) ("[A] 'hearing'
is the equitable equivalent of trial ... and does not commence until the parties begin
to present evidence and arguments in order to achieve an ultimate determination of
their rights.'"(citation omitted)).
32. Dunavan v. Calandrino, 167 Ill. App. 3d 952, 959, 522 N.E.2d 347, 351
(1988) ("hearings pursuant to a section 2-615 motion to dismiss ... do not mark
the commencement of trial or hearing under section 2-1009 of the Code." (citation
omitted)). Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989) allows a
court to hear a dispositive motion such as a 2-615 motion but does not affect the
definition of "hearing" or "trial." However, after a grant of a motion to dismiss
under section 2-615 with leave to amend, a plaintiff may take a voluntary dismissal
as a matter of right. See Heinz v. County of McHenry, 122 I11.App. 3d 895, 461
N.E.2d 672 (1984) in which plaintiff was allowed to take a voluntary dismissal after
the complaint was stricken with leave to amend but before the amended complaint
was due to be filed.
33. Espedido, 172 I11.App. 3d at 470, 526 N.E.2d at 670 ("[A] 'hearing' is the
equitable equivalent of trial ... and does not commence until parties begin to present
evidence and arguments in order to achieve an ultimate determination of their
rights."); Fine 116 Ill. App 3d at 879, 452 N.E. 2d at 693 ("The question of whether
a 'hearing' has commenced . . . so as to bar the plaintiff's absolute right to dismiss
the action has been given confusing treatment by various panels of the appellate
court . . .")
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987). See supra text accompanying
note 21.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief." 35 To comprise
a counterclaim that will avert a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal, a
defendant "must allege an independent, substantive cause of action,
even though it might arise out of the same transaction. 3 6 More
importantly, however, a counterclaim need only be pleaded to preclude
a voluntary dismissal and can either be filed as a counterclaim" or
judicially labeled as one.3"
In Edwards v. Fox, 39 the court held that "after consolidation,
the defendant's third-party claim for contribution was properly considered as a counterclaim, for purposes of applying Section 2-1009."
In Edwards, an action involving a car accident, a husband (driver)
and a wife (passenger) individually sued the driver of the other car.
The defendant filed a third party complaint seeking contribution from
the husband for the wife's injuries. The defendant then moved to
have the actions consolidated, and the trial court granted the motion.
Thereafter, the driver-plaintiff sought to voluntarily dismiss under
section 2-1009. The trial court denied the motion and the driverplaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed and stated the thirdparty claim was a counterclaim in all but name, and it prevented the
plaintiff's 2-1009 dismissal. Thus, although not specifically called a
counterclaim, a third-party complaint for contribution may bar a
40
plaintiff's attempt to dismiss.
B.

CASE LAW RESTRICTION

1. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital
The Illinois Supreme Court limited plaintiffs' rights to take
voluntary dismissals in O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital.4 1 O'Connell
dealt with a conflict between section 2-1009 and Supreme Court Rule
35. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 110, para. 2-608(a) (1987) provides:

Any claim by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or
against one or more codefendants, whether in the nature of setoff, recoupment, cross claim or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for

liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief, may be pleaded as
a cross claim in any action, and when so pleaded shall be called a counterclaim.
36. Kendle, 156 II1.App. 3d at 553-554, 509 N.E.2d at 728. The court concluded
that an answer that included only a negative defense to a complaint for declaratory

relief was not a counterclaim. Therefore, a counterclaim was not properly pleaded
so as to defeat plaintiff's motion for a voluntary dismissal.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
38. Edwards v. Fox, 121 Ill. App. 3d 556, 459 N.E.2d 1083 (1984).
39. Id. at 559, 459 N.E.2d at 1085.
40. Id. at 558, 459 N.E.2d at 1084-85.
41. 112 II1. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
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42
103(b), which requires due diligence in obtaining service of summons.

The Illinois Supreme Court held that when a statute and a court rule
conflict over judicial administration, the court rule prevails. Therefore, the trial court may be barred from granting a voluntary dismissal
if the plaintiff has failed to use due diligence in obtaining a summons.

When a 103(b) motion is filed, it must be heard on its merits before
a ruling4 will be made on a plaintiff's motion to dismiss under section
2-1009. 1
Immediately following the decision in O'Connell, defendants

attempted to extend the holding to motions to dismiss for failure to45
state a claim,' to motions to dismiss based on an affirmative defense,
and to motions for summary judgment. 46 Initially the Illinois courts

chose not to extend O'Connell. 47 In fact, the courts told defendants
to petition the legislature-not the courts-for a change in section 2-

1009.48 "Any further limits on the plaintiff's common law rights,"

the Illinois Supreme Court declared, "should be enacted by the
49
legislature."
42. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 103(b) provides:
If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service prior
to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the action as a
whole or as to any unserved defendant may be dismissed without prejudice.
If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service occurs after
the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be
with prejudice. In either case the dismissal may be made on the application
of any defendant or on the court's own motion.
43. O'Connell, 112 I11.2d at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
44. See Mancuso v. Beach, 149 I11.App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589 (1986).
45. See Jacobsen v. Ragsdale, 160 I11.App. 3d 656, 513 N.E.2d 1112 (1987);
Goldberg v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 160 11. App. 3d 867, 513 N.E.2d 919
(1987); Metcalfe v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 160 11. App. 3d 47, 513 N.E.2d 12
(1987).
46. See Rohr v. Knaus, 153 I11.App. 3d 1013, 506 N.E.2d 634 (1987); Highland
v. Stevenson, 153 Ill. App. 3d 390, 505 N.E.2d 776 (1987); Russ v. Gandhy 149 I11.
App. 3d 660, 500 N.E.2d 1032 (1986).
47. Griffin v. Area E-7 Hosp. Ass'n, 158 I11.App. 3d 720, 723, 511 N.E.2d
256, 258 (1987) ("Other attempts to narrow the scope of the application of section
2-1009 have been unsuccessful where the voluntary dismissal was taken: in order to
refile with a jury demand when none was made on the filing of the first suit in the
face of a pending motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; and even in the face
of pending motions for summary judgment." (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 723-24, 158 I11. App. 3d at 259. ("As the legislature has some
concurrent jurisdiction with the courts and no other court in this State has been
willing to expand the O'Connell exception to section 2-1009 ... we decline to do so
here . . . ." The court then stated that any change was up to the legislature.).
49. Kahle, 104 Ill. 2d at 308, 472 N.E.2d at 789.
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Muskat v. Sternberg

The Illinois Supreme Court, however, extended the O'Connell
holding in Muskat v. Sternberg.5 o In Muskat, the plaintiff filed suit
against a surgeon, hospital and manufacturer alleging negligence and
product liability one day before the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations."' For two years, the plaintiff neither attempted nor
obtained service of process upon the defendant, and the action was
dismissed for want of prosecution.5 2 The plaintiff later refiled her
complaint, 3 and the defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 103(b),
alleging the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence in effectuating the service of process.5 4 The trial court denied the motion,
holding that the time from refiling the lawsuit to service of summons
was the proper period by which to measure the plaintiff's diligence.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded
the case.55
In affirming the appellate court's reversal, the Illinois Supreme
Court quoted O'Connell: "We further hold that, in ruling on the
pending Rule 103(b) motions, the trial court may consider the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's service of process on his original as
well as his refiled complaint. 5 6 The Supreme Court refused the
plaintiff's assertion that the O'Connell holding should only be applied
prospectively and reasoned that O'Connellrelated to procedural rather
than substantive matters and was not a clear change of law. 57
3.

Gibellina v. Handley

Although the Illinois Supreme Court first firmly declined to
extend O'Connell from 103(b) motions to other dispositive motions,
it recently changed its view and substantially limited the use of
voluntary dismissals in Gibellina v. Handley.58 The Illinois Supreme
Court consolidated three cases in Gibellina, all procedurally similar
in many respects. In each case the plaintiff was barred from using
50. 122 Ill.
2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988).

51. Id. at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
52. Id.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987) permits a plaintiff to refile an

action once upon taking a voluntary dismissal after the statute of limitations has run.
See infra text at note 68.
54. 122 I1.2d at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 43-44, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
Id. at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 934.
Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 936.
127 Ill.
2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
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expert witnesses for failure to disclose their names, expertise, and
opinions. Because an expert opinion was necessary to prove the claim
in each case, the appellants filed pretrial motions for summary
judgment. The appellees each subsequently filed a motion for voluntary dismissal before any decision had been entered on the motions
for summary judgment.5 9 In each case, the trial courts granted the
motions for summary judgment and denied the motions for voluntary
dismissal. The appellate courts reversed, holding that the trial courts
did not have discretion to hear the motions for summary judgments
in advance of the motions for voluntary dismissal, 6° and the Illinois
6
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. '
Although the Illinois Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule
similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), 62 the court held that
"the trial court may hear and decide a motion which has been filed
prior to a section 2-1009 motion when that motion, if favorably ruled
' 63
on by the court, could result in a final disposition of the case.
Although at first glance this may appear to significantly limit the
impact of section 2-1009, the court was careful to state that the
holding "of course, does not assure an automatic denial of the section
2-1009 motion, for it is quite possible that the opposing party's prior
filed motion is without merit; in that case the subsequent 2-1009
motion must be granted." 64 Thus, plaintiff's statutory right to voluntarily dismiss may be limited if a defendant's dispositive motion is
ruled on favorably.
C.

PERCEIVED POTENTIAL ABUSE

Defendants sought to expand O'Connell because they felt that
65
plaintiffs often abuse their absolute right to voluntary dismissals.
Furthermore, defendants feared that a plaintiff who can voluntarily
dismiss a claim or action and then refile it within one year, 66 after the
statute of limitations has run, could abuse that right and thus make
defendants the targets of vexatious lawsuits. 6 The concern was that

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 125, 535 N.E.2d at 860.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 135, 535 N.E.2d at 864.
Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 138, 535 N.E.2d 858, 866 (1989).
Id.
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).

67. See supra note 14.
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plaintiffs would continually dismiss and then refile. However, this
worry is unfounded.
Section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure allows for
the refiling of a claim within one year after it has been dismissed
without prejudice. It provides:
In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any other
act or contract where the time for commencing an action is
limited, if . . . the action is voluntarily dismissed by the
plaintiff ... then, whether or not the time limitation for
bringing such action expires during the pendency of such
action, the plaintiff ... may commence a new action within
one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater .... after the action is voluntarily dismissed by
6
the plaintiff. 1
Defendants complain that section 2-1009 in conjunction with section
13-217 allows plaintiffs multiple filings of the same action.
1. PotentialAbuse Diminished by Refiling Limit
By allowing a plaintiff to refile after a voluntary dismissal,
plaintiffs might attempt to abuse the system by repeatedly filing a
suit and then dismissing it. However, the Illinois courts have recognized this problem and have refused to permit section 13-217 to be
used to harass defendants. 69 The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
that plaintiffs are entitled to only one refiling after the statute expires
pursuant to the savings provision of section 13-217. 70 The Illinois
Supreme Court stated that section 13-217 "was not intended to permit
multiple refilings following voluntary dismissals of an action for which
the original statute of limitations has lapsed. A contrary interpretation
would foster abuse of the judicial system by allowing a nondiligent
plaintiff to circumvent ... the otherwise applicable statue of limitations.""1 Thus, the potential for abuse is significantly diminished by
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).
69. Tuch v. McMillen, 167 Ill. App. 3d 747, 750, 521 N.E.2d 1218, 1221
("[section 13-217] acts as a limited extension [of the statute of limitations] to prevent
injustice; it should not, however, be permitted to become a harassing renewal of
litigation.'").
70. Gendek v. Jehangir, 119 11.2d 338, 343-344, 518 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (1988).
See also Tuch, 167 Ill.
App. 3d at 750, 521 N.E.2d at 1221. Both Gendek and Tuch
hold that when a plaintiff takes a voluntary dismissal after the statute of limitations
runs, the plaintiff may refile once, but only once.
71. Gendek, 119 Il.2d at 343, 518 N.E.2d at 1053.
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allowing only one refiling pursuant to section 13-217 after a voluntary
dismissal.
Potential Abuse Diminished by Payment of Costs
The potential for abuse is further reduced by the statutory
72
requirement that plaintiffs pay costs before dismissal. Plaintiffs may
dismiss without prejudice upon notice to all parties and upon payment
of costs. 73 "Costs are allowances in the nature of incidental damages
awarded by law to reimburse the prevailing party, to some extent at
least, for the expenses necessarily incurred in the assertion of his
rights in court." ' 74 Thus, defendant's appearance and jury demand
75
fees may be taxed as costs, but deposition expenses may not. In
1982, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the problem raised by
defendants that refusing to allow taxation of deposition costs would
encourage oppressive use of voluntary dismissals. In Galowich v.
Beech Aircraft Corp. 76 the court stated:
This argument misses the mark. It assumes a conclusion, viz
that plaintiff's suit is groundless, without merit and filed solely
to harass. If this were so, the defendants would have a remedy
under Section 41 of the Civil Procedure Act [now Ill. Rev.
Further, it cannot be said
Stat. ch. 110A section 137] ....
that a plaintiff's exercise of a statutory right to dismiss upon
the terms specified by the statute is oppressive or unfair to a
defendant .... Moreover, plaintiffs as well as defendants
must bear the expense of depositions which they cause to be
of necessary depositions to which
taken (with the exception
77
applies).
208(d)
Rule
Thus, section 2-1009 diminishes potential abuses by conditioning a
voluntary dismissal upon payment of costs.
2.

Potential Abuse Diminished by Other Procedural Rules
In addition to the provisions in section 2-1009, other provisions
in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure protect against litigation
3.

72. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1987).
App. 3d 139, 141, 502 N.E.2d 1172,
73. Kahle v. John Deere Co., 151 Ill.
1173 (1986).
74. Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 92 Il1. 2d 157, 165-66, 441 N.E.2d 318,
321 (1982).
75. Id. at 165, 441 N.E.2d at 321.
76. 82 Il.2d 157, 441 N.E.2d 319 (1982).
77. Id. at 167-68, 441 N.E.2d at 322-23.
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abuses. Within the context of the Code, section 2-1009 strikes a
balance between the interests of the plaintiff, defendant and court,"8
and should be tested as to its fairness in its individual application and
its application along with other procedural rules;7 9 some rules give the
plaintiff an advantage and other rules give the defendant an advantage.
For example, a plaintiff initially chooses the defendants and the
claims, 0 although those choices are not without limitations."' If the
plaintiff's choice is unreasonable or frivolous, the defendant has
several available options. The defendant may file a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action as to any claim or any defendant, 2
or may initiate discovery and file a motion for summary judgment."
In addition, if the plaintiff fails to comply with discovery orders, the
defendant may ask the court to dismiss the case, exclude evidence or
witnesses, and assess attorney's fees.8 4 Moreover, if the case is filed
without reasonable inquiry into the facts or law or is frivolous, the
defendant may ask for fees regardless of whether the plaintiff takes
a voluntary dismissal.85 If the plaintiff is allowed to take a voluntary
dismissal in order to abandon an unmeritorious case order to correct
a defect, then section 2-1009 has served its purpose and the overall
purpose of the Code to dispose of the case on the merits. 6 If the case
78. Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d at 132-33, 535 N.E.2d at 863 ("As one Court noted,
'[t]he present wording of the statute, then, is an apparent compromise between two
extremes: the view that a plaintiff has an unfettered ability to dismiss his case, and
the view that the inconvenience and expense suffered by a defendant can thwart a
plaintiff's right of dismissal."')
79. Id. at 134-35, 535 N.E.2d 864-65.
80. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-404 (1987) (voluntary joinder of
plaintiffs); para. 2-405 (voluntary joinder of defendants); para. 2-614 (voluntary
joinder of claims) (1987).
81. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2 -406(a)(1987) (mandatory joinder of
parties).
82. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-615(a)(1987) providing in part that "a
pleading or portion thereof [may] be stricken because [it is] substantially insufficient
in law."
83. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 201 et seq (1987). (defining the scope
and limitations of discovery and the devises by which to take discovery); and ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1005(1985) (providing for summary judgments).
84. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1lA, para. 219 (providing for sanctions for failure
to comply with discovery orders ranging from striking portions of pleadings to
contempt), and para. 220 (requiring a court to exclude expert witnesses from testifying
at trial for failure to properly disclose the expert before trial).
85. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 137(1989).
86. See Gibellina v. Handley, 127 Ill. 2d 122, 137, 535 N.E.2d 858, 863 (1989).
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is refiled and the defect is uncorrected, the defendant may still present
a dispositive motion and ask for fees. 7
II.VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL IN FEDERAL COURT

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) governs voluntary dismissal
in federal court. An action may be dismissed without prejudice by
9
the plaintiff,"8 by stipulation between the parties, or by an order of
90 Rule 41(a) provides:
the court.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States,
an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of
court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion for
summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared
in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal
or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on
or including the same claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1)
of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed
at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If
a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon the defendant of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss,
the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's
objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice. 91
Thus, Rule 41(a) states a clear standard of when a plaintiff may
voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order and when a court
order is necessary. Although the language of the rule varies consid87. Johnston, The Voluntary Dismissal in Illinois-A Sword or a Shield?, 21

J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (1988) (hereinafter Johnston).

88. FED.
89. FED.
90. FED.
91. FED.

R.
R.
R.
R.

Civ.
Crv.
Civ.
CIv.

P.41(a)(l)(i).
P. 41(a)(1)(ii).
P. 41(a)(2).
P. 41(a).
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erably from section 2-1009, applying both rules to a specific fact
situation produces similar results.
A.

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BEFORE AN ANSWER OR MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Rule 41(a)(1)(i) authorizes plaintiffs to dismiss actions on their
own without court orders by filing a notice of dismissal at any time
before service by the adverse party of an answer or motion for
summary judgments, which ever occurs first, 92 Rule 41(a)(1) provides
a clear test of when a plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss: "Rule 41(a)(1)
as it was drafted simplifies the court's task by telling it whether a suit
has reached the point of no return. If the defendant has served either
an answer or a summary judgment motion it has; if the defendant
has served neither, it has not." 93 Because the language is specific, the
relative stage of the litigation is not controlling. Even after hearings
on a motion for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff may voluntarily
dismiss without prejudice and without a court order. 94 Further, a
lawsuit in which discovery has taken place for one year may still be
dismissed if an answer or summary judgment is not served. 95
B.

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BY STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES

An action may be dismissed by a stipulation between the parties.
When the parties want to dismiss the case because it has been settled,
the parties proceed under Rule 41(a)(1) (ii).96 The stipulation may
provide that the dismissal is with prejudice. 97Dismissals pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) are made without court action; thus, no court order
is necessary. 98 Although no court order is necessary, the rule requires
that the stipulation, not the settlement, be filed in court. 99 The
92. Id.

93. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Smith, 706 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir. 1983)
(defaults entered against some defendants and a preliminary injunction was entered
against others, but no answer or summary judgment was filed by any defendant).
94. Id. at 796.
95. Scam Instrument Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 458 F.2d 885 (7th Cir.
1972) (plaintiff's notice of dismissals was upheld even though a full year's discovery
was taken without an answer or motion for summary judgment being filed).
96. McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1184 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial court
retained jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreement even after plaintiff took a
voluntary dismissal).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.at 1185.
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dismissal takes effect on the date of filing,' °° and violation of a
stipulation is treated as a breach of contract which can be remedied

in state court. 10
C.

VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BY COURT ORDER

If the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1) are not met, plaintiffs may still

seek voluntary dismissals "upon order of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court deems proper."'0 2 Unless the court
specifies otherwise, this dismissal is without
prejudice. 0 3 Unlike dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1), the court must use
its discretion in granting or denying the dismissal.
Court discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) is what some attorneys,
° This
commentators and judges believe is needed in Illinois courts. "1
discretion would allow the court to deny motions for voluntary
dismissals and thereby prevent harassing or vexatious litigation and
abuse of the judicial system. However, the Seventh Circuit looks at

whether a defendant will suffer plain legal prejudice if the dismissal

is granted. Therefore, it is questionable if a rule of this type prevents

any of those injuries of which defendants now complain.'°5

Unless the defendant can show it will sustain plain legal prejudice

if the action or claim is dismissed, the district court should grant

plaintiff's motion to dismiss.' ° This ruling may be reversed on appeal
only if the appellant can establish that the court abused its discretion
100. Id.
101. McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
102. FED. R. Cry. P. 41(a)(2).
103. Id.
104. Voluntary Dismissal Limit Urged by Judge, Chicago Daily L. Bull., April
18, 1988, at 1 Col. 2; Ferrini and Winter, "Voluntary Dismissals-From Shield to
Sword by Convergence of Improvident Actions," 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 549 (1988).
105. The defendants in federal courts make complaints similar to those the
defendants make in state court. See, e.g., Kovalic v. DEC International Inc., 855
F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1988) (defendant complained that the court allowed plaintiff to
take a voluntary dismissal to avoid a summary judgment and choose another forum);
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986) (the defendant
complained that the court allowed plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal that would
cause delay in resolving the dispute); McCall-Bey v. Frazen, 777 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir.
1985) (the codefendant complained that it was prejudiced by the court allowing
plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal as to the codefendant only with whom it had
settled.)
106. Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[u]nder
[Rule 411 a defendant must demonstrate plain legal prejudice in order to prevent a
voluntary dismissal .... [T]he prospect of a second lawsuit or the creation of a
tactical advantage, is insufficient to justify denying the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.")
(citations omitted).
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in granting the dismissal. 07 The plain legal prejudice standard was
first set forth in the Seventh Circuit in Pace v. Southern Express
0 8 In Pace, the court
Company.1
stated:
Some of the factors justifying denial are the defendant's effort
and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack
of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the
action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and the fact that a motion for summary judgment has
been filed by the defendant.' °9
Nineteen years later, the Seventh Circuit in Kavolic v. DEC
International, Inc. still looked to the Pace standard in determining
whether plaintiffs' voluntary dismissals should be granted." 10 However,
the Kovalic Court noted that Pace is "simply a guide for the trial
judge . . . . "" "The enumeration of the factors to be considered in
Pace is not equivalent to a mandate that each and every such factor
be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is appropriate."' 12 Furthermore, an injury such as a second lawsuit or the
creation of a tactical advantage is not plain legal prejudice." 3 Although these injuries-the possibility of a second suit and a tactical
advantage-are not enough to deny plaintiff's dismissal, the court
can evaluate these injuries in determining whether to award attorney's
' 4
fees or costs to the defendant.
III.

REASONS WHY A "41(A)-TYPE" RULE MIGHT NOT SOLVE
PERCEIVED PROBLEMS IN ILLINOIS

Four aspects of Federal Rule 41(a) and the federal litigation
surrounding it show that adoption by Illinois of a rule similar to
107. Kovalic v. DEC International, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1988) (trial
court did not abuse its discretion in granting a voluntary dismissal so as to deprive
the defendant of "its right to defend against the lawsuit in a federal, rather than a
state, forum.").
108. 409 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1969).
109. Id. at 334 (citing 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 41.05[l] (2d ed. 1968)).
110. Kovalic, 855 F.2d at 473-74.
111. Id. at 474.
112. Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Koppers Co. Inc., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir.
1980). The defendant argued, with some justification, that "the facts of this case fit
squarely within the Pace 'test' for denying a motion to dismiss." Id. However, the
court found the trial judge had not abused his discretion in granting plaintiff a
voluntary dismissal despite the amount of discovery taken and the pending motion
for summary judgment. Id.
113. Id. at 56-57.

114. Quad/Graphics, 724 F.2d at 1233, n.2.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) would not prevent abuses of
the Illinois judicial system. First, limits on voluntary dismissals in
Illinois already prevent a plaintiff's abuse by means of vexatious
filings. Second, the discretion given a trial judge in ruling on voluntary
dismissals under Rule 41(a) would likely be duplicated if a similar
statute were adopted in Illinois. Third, because the appellate court's
standard of review for reversing the trial court's ruling is limited, any
perceived abuses would remain. Lastly, the frequent complaint that
plaintiffs utilize Rule 41(a) as a strategy of delay is an argument with
another dimension.
A. BOTH THE ILLINOIS STATUTE AND THE FEDERAL RULE ARE
SIMILAR; THEY BOTH ALLOW ONE DISMISSAL AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

Just as the Illinois Supreme Court has said that section 13-217
"was not intended to permit multiple refilings following voluntary
dismissals of an action . . .,"I the federal courts have stated, "(t)he
policy behind Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is to protect a
defendant by providing that if the plaintiff has taken advantage of
his right to early dismissal in one occasion, he may not repeat the
process with impunity. 11 16 Rule 41(a)(1) states that a "dismissal is
without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action
based on or including the same claim." 7 The two dismissal bar not
only acts on dismissals within federal courts but also between state
and federal courts. Similarly, when section 2-1009 is combined with
section 13-217, plaintiffs are entitled to only one refiling pursuant to
the savings provision of section 13-217.118 Thus, under current Illinois
and federal law, a plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss more than once,
both within Illinois courts and between Illinois state courts and federal
courts. Therefore, an adoption of a statute similar to Rule 41(a)(1)
would be superfluous because the two dismissal bar already prevents
plaintiffs' abuse of repeated vexatious filings, both in Illinois and
federal courts.

115. Gendek, 119 111. 2d at 343, 549 N.E.2d at 1058.
116. Schott v. Helper, 101 F.R.D. 99, 100 (N.D. I1. 1984) in which plaintiff

first filed and dismissed in state court, next filed and dismissed in federal court, then

refiled in federal court. The court applied the two dismissal rule as a bar to the
refiled action.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l).
118. Tuch, 167 Ill.
App. 3d at 751, 521 N.E.2d at 1221.
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TRIAL COURT STANDARD FOR RULING ON DISMISSALS

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), a trial court should
grant a voluntary dismissal unless the defendant can show he will
sustain plain legal prejudice. 11 9 The trial judge has broad discretion in
ruling on a voluntary dismissal. Judges who are loath to impose
modest sanctions on motions to compel discovery are not likely to
deny a motion for a voluntary dismissal.120 Even if the judges were
inclined to deny a motion for a voluntary dismissal, they would have
to find the defendant suffered "legal prejudice.' 2'

The boundaries

of legal prejudice are not precise. However, it must be substantial,
clear, or plain.

22

It

is

"something

other than the necessity that

defendant might face in defending another action. That kind of
disadvantage can be taken care of by a condition that plaintiff pay
to defendant its costs and expenses incurred in the first action."'2 3
If Illinois adopted a statute similar to the federal rule, the
likelihood is great that the perceived abuse would continue.2 4 The
119.
120.
121.
122.

Quad/Graphics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983).
Johnston, supra note 87, at 546.
Quad/Graphics, 724 F.2d at 1233.
See, e.g., 5 J. MooRE, W. TAGGARD & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL

§ 41.05(1) (2d ed.1986) at 41-62, 63. ("Where substantial prejudice is
lacking, the district court should exercise its discretion by granting a motion for
voluntary dismissal without prejudice."); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2364 (1971) (district court will deny motion if defendant
will be seriously prejudiced by a dismissal); Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033,
1036 (4th Cir. 1986) (voluntary dismissal "should not be denied absent substantial
prejudice to the defendant") Id.; McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856-57
(11th Cir. 1986) ("in most cases a dismissal should be granted unless the defendant
will suffer clear legal prejudice"); Hamilton v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 679
F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982) ("plain legal prejudice" required) Id.; LeCompte v.
Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976) (dismissal should generally be
granted "unless the defendant will suffer some legal harm"). Id.
123. Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984) in which
the court stated:
in the federal courts, after answer, such dismissals should be granted only
'if no other party will be prejudiced.' (citation omitted). By 'prejudice' in
this context is meant something other than the necessity that defendant
might face of defending another action. That kind of disadvantage can be
taken care of by a condition that plaintiff pay to defendant its costs and
expenses incurred in the first action. One sort of prejudice that cannot be
cured by the attachment of conditions is the loss by defendant of success in
the first case. If defendant has already won its case, reimbursement of fees
and expenses cannot make it whole from the injury of being sued again,
perhaps this time to lose.
Id.
124. See Johnston, supra note 87, at 543.
PRACTICE
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plain legal prejudice standard is a strict standard but it gives the
5
courts broad discretion in ruling on voluntary dismissals., Therefore,
it is likely defendants would continue to complain about "the perto manage and control litigation
ceived reticence of . . .trial court(s)
26
as tightly as (they) might like.'
C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THE APPELLATE COURTS

A district court's decision to grant plaintiff's motion for dismissal
without prejudice is within the district court's discretion and will not
be reversed unless the appellant can show the court abused its discretion.127 Although abuse of discretion is the standard of review gener12
ally stated, the standard of "zone of choice" has also been used.
The idea of discretion presupposes a zone of choice in which the trial
court may either grant or deny the motion. 129 The standard of zone
30 and
of choice was first used in administrative agency decisions,
narrowly restricts review by appellate courts, resulting in only rare
reversals. Since district courts only deny plaintiffs' motions for voluntary dismissal if there is plain legal prejudice, the district courts are
not likely to generously grant dismissals. Because the standard of
review is so narrow and the district court's discretion is so broad,
these rulings will be upheld. Therefore, the adoption of a statute
similar to Rule 41(a) will not prevent perceived abuses because the
appellate court has limited authority to reverse the trial court's ruling.
D.

DELAY

Although defendants often complain that plaintiffs use Rule 41
as a tactic to delay, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
United States v. OutboardMarine Corp.3 defendants are no strangers
to delay, and, like plaintiffs, attempt to gain as many tactical advantages as possible. In OutboardMarine Corp., an estimated 1.1 million
pounds of polychlorinated biphenyles (PCB) rested on a harbor bed
125. The trial court must apply the correct standard and consider relevant factors
in deciding whether the plain legal prejudice exists, but in applying the standard and
considering the factors has a broad range of choice which is reversed only if the trial
court commits a clear error of judgment. See Kern, 738 F.2d at 970.
2d at 135, 535 N.E.2d at 861.
126. Gibellina, 127 I11.
127. Tyco Laboratories, 627 F.2d at 56.
128. See Kovalic, 855 F.2d at 474.
129. Id.

130. See Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1984) for application of the
"zone of choice" standard in review of an administrative decision.
131. 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
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in Waukegan, Illinois. The government brought an action to require
Outboard Marine to clean up the polychlorinated biphenyles from the
harbor. "This case," the court noted in affirming the trial court's
grant of the government's motion for a voluntary dismissal, "has a
lengthy and tangled history spawning numerous decisions by this and
other courts. It is unfortunate that [the court is] unable to write the
final chapter at this time and thus the conclusion of this case will
have to wait another day."''
Instead of forcing the appellant, Outboard Marine, to remove
the PCB, the government decided to dismiss the action, clean up the
waste and then charge Outboard for the cost, pursuant to CERCLA
section 107. The court allowed the government to dismiss the action
with the promise to pay for fees and costs and not to sue for injunctive
relief. Outboard complained that the dismissal should not have been
granted and that the government was abusing the judicial system by
using delaying tactics. The appellants felt that the government was
"acting with less than a sincere motive in requesting that the court
dismiss its action without prejudice in order that it might remove the
PCB from the harbor and later sue for the cost of removal."'' 33 The
court was puzzled by the complaint and noted:
The appellants have fought the government every possible inch
of the way for over six years in court concerning the validity
of the proposed injunctive relief action and whether the State
of Illinois was a proper party to this action. A major reason
why the PCB problem has not been resolved at this point in
time is the continuous and protracted litigation of this case.
While we do not fault the appellants for exercising their
constitutional right to defend this action in the manner they
believe is most appropriate, it is 'too late in the day' for them
to complain that they somehow have been prejudiced by the
delay in this case in proceeding to trial for they actively
participated in this litigation nightmare which we are sad to
say is far from its final chapter.3 4 The court further stated,
"they knowingly and actively participated in the delay by
contesting the government's position taken throughout this
litigation, obviously in the hope of postponing the day of
reckoning as long as possible."' 3 5
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 498.
Id.at 503.
Id.at 504.
United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Thus, although defendants often complain of delay in both state
and federal court, they also delay litigation when it furthers their
interests. To a large extent, delay is inherent in litigation, particularly
complex litigation, and often is decried when it results in little, if any,
unforeseen harm. Delay also is decried at times to mask other tactics
(even delay) by those who complain of it.
E.

OTHER PROCEDURAL RULES

In addition to the four protections already discussed, other
procedural rules exist which protect defendants against perceived
plaintiff abuse of the judicial system. These rules protect defendants
by limiting the time a plaintiff can refile, 3 6 by ensuring compliance
with discovery requests,' 3 7 and by barring frivolous actions.'
A plaintiff is entitled to refile only once and the refiling must be
within one year after the action has been dismissed or within the
remaining period of limitation.' 3 9 Clearly, allowing a plaintiff to refile
within the period of the limitation is unoffensive and equitable.
Further, "[s]hould an individual case be refiled pursuant to section
13-217, a diligent defense, using available motions, need not counte40
nance a controversy languishing in the courts for a decade."'
An additional procedural protection is a motion to comply with
discovery requests. If a party fails to comply with discovery orders or
rules, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219 allows a court to "order that
the offending party or his attorney pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney's fees incurred by any party as a result of the
misconduct.''4 In addition, if a defendant believes that a case is filed
without reasonable cause and found to be untrue or not "grounded
in fact" or "warranted by law," the defendant may request sanc136. ILL. REV.
accompanying text.
137. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987). See supra note 68 and

STAT. ch. I 1OA, para. 219 (1987) provides for sanctions
for
to
comply
with
discovery orders that range from striking portions of pleadings
failure
to contempt.
138. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1lOA, para. 137 (1989) which requires lawyers to sign
pleadings and other papers filed in court and that the signature constitutes a
certification that the pleader has made a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law
and that the allegations in the pleading or statement in the paper is supported by the
facts and law. Violation of para. 137 exposes the lawyer who signs the pleadings to
sanctions.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1987).
140. Gibelliana, 127 11. 2d at 135, 535 N.E.2d at 865.
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 219 (1987).
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tions.142 These sanctions include discipline and the payment of costs
and attorney fees. 143 Thus, with these procedural rules, "defendants
are not left, as they may cry, at the mercy of wolves; they do have
recourse."'"
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois statute on voluntary dismissals is a compromise
between "the view that a plaintiff has an unfettered ability to (voluntarily) dismiss his case, and the view that the inconvenience and
expense suffered by the defendant can thwart a plaintiff's right of
dismissal."' 45 To the extent that the statute interferes with the constitutional powers or the authority of the judiciary to discharge its duties
fairly and expeditiously, the Court in O'Connell and Gibellina has
addressed and solved those problems. Problems complained of by the
defendants' bar will not necessarily solved by adoption of a statute
similar to Federal Rule of Civil procedure 41(a). Indeed, it may merely
shift the argument to another point or may give defendants a windfall
at the expense of plaintiffs.' 46 Furthermore, because the federal and
Illinois judicial systems often deal with different subject matter,
parallel procedural provisions are not always appropriate. A small
tort or contract dispute in the state courts does not present the same
procedural or administrative problems as a multi-million dollar securities case in the federal courts. To equate the two systems without
more is misleading.
At present, plaintiffs and defendants derive different advantages
from the rules generally and from some specifically. The rules must
be judged as a whole.' 47 The rules give both plaintiffs and defendants
some advantages in the pretrial stages of litigation, and some during
the trial itself. Within the present arrangement of the rules, the
perceived abuses (which may be unfounded) may not be corrected by
the adoption of a statute similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a). Further, the defendants are adequately protected in the balance
with other procedural rules such as sanctions or dismissals with
prejudice and assessment of fees and costs.

142.
143.
144.
145.
(1980).
146.
147.

Id. para. 137.
Johnston, supra note 87.
Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d at 135, 535 N.E.2d at 865.
In re Marriage of Wright, 92 I1. App. 3d 708, 711, 415 N.E.2d 1196, 1199
Johnston, supra note 87.
Id. at 547.

